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Abstract Th e paper is about a key term of Niklas Luhmann’s System Th eory: the term 
‘Sense’. According to System Th eory, ‘Sense’ can be defi ned as the medium of social reality: a 
universal medium of the systems of consciousness and communication that enables the reduction 
of the world’s complexity (the environment of the systems). Th e world is made up of senseful 
operations, and as such it is bound to the systems also formed by these operations. Th e world 
as environment (the ‘outside’) and the identity of the observer (the system; the ‘inside’) are 
both eff ects of senseful operations. Sense is not a substance, but a relation. It is not essential but 
processual. Th e paper places the term ‘Sense’ in the context of some other important terms of 
System Th eory, like ‘medium’, ‘form’, ‘system’ ‘environment’, and also gives a brief summary of 
the theoretical frame, inasmuch it presents the tradition of ‘second order cybernetics’ developed 
by Heinz von Foerster.
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Introduction
Th e theory of Niklas Luhmann is usually 
called ‘system theory’, even though he himself 
said this term would be only a ‘brand’ and 
nothing else (Luhmann 2009 [1984]. 7–15). 
Based on the brand ‘system theory’, superfi -
cial interpretations declare Luhmann’s work 
to be a kind of structuralism, a maze of rigid 
system-categories. However, a deeper study of 
Luhmann’s theory quickly makes it apparent 
that the Luhmannian systems are structures 
not defi ned by principles outside of them, but 
by momentarily existing operations of ‘sense’. 
Th is paper is about this key term of the Luh-
mannian theory.
Heinz von Foerster’s second order 
cybernetics and the Luhmannian systems
Th e Luhmannian term ‘Sense’ has two 
main roots. One is Edmund Husserl’s phenom-
enology: the Husserlian impacts on Luhmann’s 
work and the relations between the authors in 
general are very nicely presented in Jakob Ar-
noldis’s paper ‘Sense making as communica-
tion’ and they are also expressed by Luhmann 
himself in his book on Husserl. Th at is why this 
paper starts with the other root, which is less 
known, even though it is as important as the 
Husserlian one.
Th is other root of the term ‘Sense’ (and 
Luhmann’s theory in general) can be found 
in Heinz von Foerster’s ‘second order cy-
bernetics’. Th e Austrian author Heinz von 
Foertser worked out a complex epistemology 
on the basis of classical cybernetics (Foerster 
2003.). He tried to develop a point of view that 
replaces the linear and rigid structure of the 
object-subject (observer-observed) distinction. 
According to Foerster, the observer is really 
constructed by the observed and vice versa: 
‘observation’ is nothing else but the circular 
relation between them. Observation as a rela-
tion defi nes the observer and the observed, so 
the observer refers not only to the observed, 
but also to himself by the act of observation. 
Th is crucial self-reference of the observer can 
be taken as another main point of the circular 
way of thinking or – as Foerster named it – 
the “cybernetics of cybernetics”. Humberto 
Maturana’s famous defi nition sums this all 
up: “everything said is said by an observer” 
(Maturana 1987. 65–82.) So the relation of 
observer and observed (subject and object) is 
defi ned more as co-ordination than subordi-
nation.
Foerster sees the main diff erence not 
between subject and object (observer and ob-
served), but between the orders of observation. 
His favourite illustration for this is the case of 
the blind spot. Using Foerster’s terms, the fi rst 
order of observation (our eye’s direct observa-
tion) is unable to get a coherent and complete 
image about the world out there. What we can 
see is something we learnt to see: the image 
we “see” is a result of computing processes. 
Actually, it is our brain that “sees”: it observes 
the observation of the eyes transmitted to the 
visual cortex. Th e blind spot can be seen only 
by conscious observation of the observation 
of our brain. Th is is self-reference (one of Fo-
erster’s a key terms): when we are looking for 
the blind spot, we are actually observing our 
own observation; we are observing ourselves 
as we are observing. In Foerster’s blind spot 
experiment, we glimpse our own blindness. 
A paradoxical situation arises: we can see that 
we cannot see, so we see (that we cannot see). 
With the help of the introduction of a new 
(second) order of observation, the observation 
of the fi rst order of observation will be possible. 
Th e second order of observation in that case is 
self-observation: we can observe how the fi rst 
order of our observation works.
Cybernetics, says Foerster (or rather, “the 
fi rst order of cybernetics”, as he named the 
traditional form of cybernetics), uses feedback 
only on the level of the elements (objects) of 
the observed system. In spite of that, Foer-
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ster’s “second order of cybernetics” is circular 
insofar as the cybernetician takes himself as 
part of the observed system. Th e description 
of reality depends more on the describing 
system (subject) than on the “reality out there” 
(object). Foerster’s “undiff erentiated encod-
ing principle” says that we only have data of 
quantitative kind. Our neural system “knows” 
only the place and intensity of any stimulus. 
All qualities of any impression are made by the 
observing system itself: that is the basis of the 
famous idea of “operational closure” developed 
by Humberto Maturana.
Niklas Luhmann’s oeuvre can be inter-
preted as a combination of the second order 
of cybernetics and the theory of autopoetic 
systems, applied in the fi eld of social sciences 
(Luhmann 1995.) . Concepts like the distinc-
tion between ‘closed’ and ‘open’ systems and 
the self-regulation of these systems were key 
problems of general system theory from the 
1950s on. Closed systems do not take any 
material (possible element of the system) from 
their environment in their functioning. Th e 
elements of open systems are, on the other 
hand, in the condition of permanent stream-
ing: they can transgress on the borders of 
the system. Th ey are tending towards a more 
complex and diff erentiated state. Open systems 
are not only characterized by the production of 
entropy (like closed systems), but also by the 
transmission of entropy. Th e relation between 
system and environment is a specifi c problem 
of the theory of open systems.
One of the most important questions 
of cybernetics was how the states of systems 
can be stabilized under continually changing 
environmental conditions. Th e feedback mod-
els (developed for answering that question) 
seemed universal for classical cybernetics; that 
is why cybernetics could be considered to be 
able to describe technical, social and psychic 
systems.
Aft er this brief summary of cybernetics 
and system theory the main questions of the 
Luhmannian way of system theory and cy-
bernetics can be asked: 1. how can we defi ne 
a system? 2. how is the distinction between 
the system and its environment produced and 
reproduced? 3. what is the exact operation that 
produces the distinction, and how is it able to 
decide (inside the system) what belongs to the 
system? According to Luhmann, these prob-
lems had been considered in two diff erent ways 
in earlier system theory: some arguments took 
systems as substantial, some others as analyti-
cal categories. Luhmann rejects both, because 
both of them constitute observing positions 
outside the systems, so they consider system 
theory itself an observer outside the world it 
observes. Th ey say – according to Luhmann’s 
argumentation – that system theory as a sci-
entifi c position of observation is not a part of 
the “world” it observes. Based on Foerster’s 
theories of observation (summarized above), 
Luhmann can easily reject this position. His 
(and Foerster’s) starting point is the negation of 
objective observation. Th e observer must enter 
into the observation. Th e distinction between 
observer and observed is made by the ob-
server’s act of observing himself as he observes. 
Observed (self)observation produces the ob-
served (the result and matter of observation).
In connection with this, Luhmann claims 
we can see that systems cannot be defi ned by 
their borders because the borders are constant-
ly changing, and there is no (objective) position 
of observation. His answer (and innovation) is 
the dynamic concept of the system. He says: 
“Th e system is nothing else actually but the 
diff erence of the system and the environment.” 
(Luhmann 2004. 66.) A diff erentiated system 
does not equal the sum and connections of its 
elements, but it is built by system/environment 
diff erences – even as the diff erences between 
observer and observed construct the process 
of observation and the process of observation 
makes the diff erence between observer and 
observed in Foerster’s theory.
Th e medium (in this case: tool, territory 
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and matter) is the sense. It is in this medium 
that the systems of communication and the 
systems of consciousness operate: both are 
characterized by specifi c ways of operation, 
and neither can be derived from the other. 
Th e basic operation in the case of the system 
of consciousness is thinking; in the case of the 
system of communication (the social system, 
says Luhmann) it is communication. Th ey can 
appear for each other only as environment (it 
is not possible to derive communication from 
consciousness). We have to understand the 
forms of sense appearing in communication 
systems (the structures of sociality or “social 
reality”) in a “sui generis” way.
Towards the right question about sense: 
“How does it function?” instead of “What 
is it?”
We can thus draw the following conclu-
sions: 1. only autopoietic systems are able to 
observe. 2. the way of observation necessar-
ily contains the element of self-reference. 3. 
the operations called ‘observation’ can be 
performed only in the medium of sense: the 
systems of consciousness and communication 
are sense-producing and sense-processing sys-
tems. (Th ey operate in the sense and thereby 
(re)produce sense.)
Th e ‘world’ as an endlessly complex and 
as such unobservable environment must be 
reduced to forms delivered by the medium of 
sense. Systems are created in the sense: this 
medium enables the distinction between self- 
and other-references, which is the distinction 
of system and environment. Sense also enables 
the temporal continuity of this distinction 
(Luhmann 1997. 51., 54.). Th e complexity of 
the ‘world’ stays unspecifi ed: any kind of order 
can be based only on the forms of sense which 
are done by distinction-drawings of systems. 
(Luhmann 1987. 44–46.) 
Th e context of sense can be created by 
transgressing on the borders of the system: the 
system itself is able to interpret its environment 
as the ‘other’ side of the distinction between 
self- and other-reference (remember: when a 
system observes, it always observes itself and 
the environment, because observation is al-
ways drawing a distinction between self- and 
other-reference, between, so to speak, “Me” 
and the “World”.) Th e main characteristic of 
the forms of sense is that they are able to mean 
themselves (as actual) and something else (as 
potential) at the same time (Luhmann 1997. 
48.). Consequently, the world can be observed 
in the medium of sense, but it cannot be taken 
as something already given (which means that 
it only comes into existence in the process of 
observation). No kind of substantial world-
concepts can be acceptable for the Luhmann-
ian theory. For the systems of sense, the world 
cannot be anything else but information-
potential from which meaningful identities 
(objects, symbols, signs) can be formed by 
the process of observation (Luhmann 1997. 
46–47.).
I will discuss the correspondence between 
sense and information later; now I would only 
like to emphasize that information is closely 
connected to the observing systems. Luh-
mann’s concept of information is deontologi-
cal: information can be produced only by the 
operation of observation of observing systems 
and does not have any ontological character.
Th e Places of Sense
If we want to ask the question “what is 
sense?”, we can hardly fi nd a right answer 
within the Luhmannian theoretical context 
and terminology. Th e question in fact is an 
ontological one. According to the Luhmannian 
point of view, sense is not ‘something’ we could 
defi ne. We cannot observe sense as a whole, 
because it is impossible to take an observing 
position that enables that. It is impossible to 
observe sense, because there is no observing 
position outside of it. Sense contains (makes 
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possible) all potential observations and ob-
serving positions. So we cannot observe sense, 
because we are inside of it when we observe. We 
cannot see it; we cannot defi ne it as ‘something’ 
(Karácsony 2003.).
Th us, the right question should rather be 
“How does sense function?” For answering 
that question, fi rst of all it is worth examining 
where sense functions. In other words: what is 
the vehicle of sense? In the Luhmannian theory 
these vehicles are the autopoietic systems of 
consciousness and communication. We have 
to keep in mind that these are coequal kinds of 
systems. Th at is why it is impossible to say that 
consciousness is the primary vehicle of sense, 
and why Luhmann argues in many texts for 
a concept of sense which is not bound to any 
form of “subject” (Luhmann 1987, 1997, 2008.). 
He rejects the identity between sense and sub-
jective intentions. (He says in that case the next 
question would stay unanswered: “What is 
then the sense of the subject?” – If we accept the 
term “subject”, we already presuppose sense.)
Th ere is no ontological basis or vehicle 
that would bear sense (subject or conscious-
ness for example), so we have to understand it 
independently of all these (Luhmann 2006.). 
Sense is neither the advent of the spirit in the 
world (Hegel), nor vice versa (Husserl) (Luh-
mann 2008. 15.). Luhmann describes sense 
neither as substance nor as phenomenon, but 
as relation or context (Luhmann 1987. 19.). 
Sense is not a content of consciousness but a 
rule of selection. It is a distinction; in fact it is 
a basic medium / form-diff erence (Luhmann 
2006. 217.) in the form of potential/actual. 
Th e self-referential side of the diff erence is the 
actual, which is always connected to the other-
referential side, the potential. Th e medium of 
the sense is a horizon of (potentially referable) 
possibilities, and the forms of sense are actual-
izing some of them: these are the “contents” of 
sense. Sense reduces the complexity of the en-
vironment (world) in that way, and also keeps 
the complexity as the horizon of potential: 
sense is nothing else but a selectively working 
relation between the system and the “world” 
(Luhmann 1987. 23.).
Th e answer for the question about the 
place of the sense can be formulated: sense is 
between the system and the world. In other 
words: it is in the relation of the system and 
the world. More precisely: it is the relation 
itself. Sense appears always in certain forms 
but it always transgresses these forms, because 
it makes other possibilities imaginable. Th e 
relation of the systems and sense is a constitu-
tive and contingent one. (Contingent because 
potential options are always there; any order, 
any form of a system is only a possible one 
among others.) (Luhmann 1987. 20–21. and 
Luhmann 2006. 223–224.). 
Th e functioning of sense is character-
ized by the urge of selection. It must keep the 
complexity on the external side (outside the 
system), and it must reduce it on the internal 
side (inside the system). Systems come into 
existence by selective reduction of the horizon 
of potentialities (which is the medium of sense). 
Systems are the forms of sense. Th e system is 
actual, the world is potential. Th e borders of the 
systems are borders of sense drawn moment 
by moment. Th ey are contingent, and they can 
change in every moment.
Sense as medium and form
Th e term ‘form’ can be defi ned as the 
unity of a certain distinction and marking 
which always takes place in a certain medium. 
Th e form is the actualization of the medium: 
it makes actual some potentialities of the me-
dium by distinction (selection). Sentences, for 
example, are forms of the medium ‘language’ 
(Luhmann 2006. 214–217.). So the form selects 
a certain terrain of the medium, and signs it 
as fi eld of further operations. Luhmann names 
this terrain ‘marked space’. Th is is the inner 
side of the form: then, further distinctions 
can be drawn. Th ese further operations in the 
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marked space are called ‘re-enties’ (Brunczel 
2010. 28–46.). 
If we take a closer look at the medium 
of sense, it becomes obvious that we have to 
specify what we said about its potential charac-
ter. For being able to off er potential options for 
form-creating operations, the horizon of sense 
cannot be infi nite. Its potentialities cannot 
be applied to anything. Th e world cannot be 
“whatever”. Th e infi nite character of possibili-
ties, the reference to “anything” is narrowed 
down by the process of repression which limits 
the possible options (Luhmann 2008. 25.). Th e 
process of repression marks a set of options as 
‘possible’ (this is the marked space), set apart 
from the ‘impossible’. (‘Possible’ is anything 
what can exist or happen.) Th e marked space 
of the possible is open for the re-entry: that is, 
further operations can be done which make 
further distinctions between actual and po-
tential (both must be possible!) – and this is 
how the ‘real’ comes into existence (Luhmann 
2008. 15–16.).
Repression operates with negation. Th e 
possibility of negation separates the possible 
from the impossible. ‘Possible’ is anything 
(and only that is possible) that can be negated: 
this is the marked space open for re-entry of 
further (in that case dividing ‘right’ from ‘false) 
operations. So the possibility of negation is the 
operation of repression. (Sense itself cannot be 
negated, because it contains negation as such. 
Even the sides of distinction meaningless/
meaningful are meaningful.)
Following repression, the next step is 
making concrete forms. One principal tool 
of that is time, which enables the continuity 
of form-making (in the order of before/aft er). 
At this point, it is important to keep in mind 
that operations are happening instantaneously, 
they do not have extension in time. To keep up a 
continuous existence, systems must reproduce 
their operations and exactly that helps time in 
the form (distinction) of before/aft er which 
marks the present of the operation and divides 
it from the past (not actual any more) and from 
the future (not actual yet) (Luhmann 2008. 13.; 
Luhmann 1997. 52–53.). 
In addition to time, there are two other 
dimensions in which sense comes into exist-
ence (makes negations possible): the material 
and the social ones (Luhmann 2006. 225.; 
Karácsony 2003.; Luhmann 1987. 31–32.). 
Th e social dimension of sense includes the 
experiences of Me and Others referring to each 
other (in Luhmann’s words: ego and alter). Dif-
ferent concepts of the world are applied to each 
other in forms of communication: consenses 
and dissenses. Communicable forms of sense 
come into existence in this dimension. (Th is 
aspect of the Luhmannian concept of sense is 
very close to the Husserlian term ‘intersubjec-
tivity’.) Sense creates a kind of normative and 
technical aspect in this dimension in order to 
make possible processes of communication 
(between systems of consciousnesses which are 
operationally closed for each other).
Th e material dimension reduces the world 
to the schema of thingness. It emphasizes that 
the aspect of communication according to it is 
always about something: it marks something 
in the world and the marked object becomes 
actual by the marking (divided from the not-
marked rest of the world which stays potential). 
Th e material dimension is closely connected to 
the social and temporal ones: these give context 
to the material sense (Luhmann 1987. 32.).
Systems operating in the medium of sense 
are able to assign causality to the continuity. 
Th is way they can transgress the borders of 
themselves by assigning causality to their 
environment.
By the interplay of the dimensions the 
form of information in the use of sense comes 
into existence. Th e function of sense (as we 
have seen above) is a selective relation of the 
system and the world. As we have also seen, 
sense is not a content of consciousness but a 
set of rules of selections. Contents enter into 
the experience (in the case of systems of con-
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sciousness) and communication (in the case 
of systems of communication) as information. 
Information is actually also an operation; the 
application of form, selection. It is a conscious 
selection led by sense and as such it is always 
contingent (Luhmann 1987. 26.). 
Regarding systems of communication we 
have to draw the conclusion that we cannot 
conceptualize communication as a transfer 
of information or sense, but only as mutual 
sense-actualization on the basis of common 
structure of sense delivered by the social di-
mension of sense.
Regarding the systems of consciousness, 
the most important term is ‘experience’. Th is 
is nothing but surprising information: in-
formative modifi cation of the expected; an 
overwriting of former premises. Experience 
is the continuous reconstruction of the sense-
ful constructed reality (Luhmann 1987. 27.). 
Information is the selection (and marking) 
of something. Th e structures of sense (its ap-
plied forms) make the preconditions of being 
able to gain information value. Events are not 
pieces of information on their own: they only 
become information in the medium of sense. 
Information can be marked only by selections 
that are interpretable for the system (that are 
contained by the sense-context of the system). 
As novelty (information) cannot appear only 
that has been given formerly as possible (Luh-
mann 2008. 38.). 
Th e novelty and connective potential of 
information mean that during a certain opera-
tion of sense it narrows the terrain of poten-
tiality in which later operations can be done. 
In other words: information makes a re-entry, 
divides new marked / unmarked spaces and 
by that it reduces complexity (entropy). (Luh-
mann 1997. 46.).
Summary
Sense is the universal medium for the 
systems of consciousness and communication 
that enables the reduction of the complexity 
of the world. It makes possible the observa-
tion of the world by forms that transgress on 
themselves (transgress the ‘actual’ in the direc-
tion of ‘potential’). Th e forms of sense mark 
the world as a horizon of potentiality. In the 
forms of sense, systems are able to observe the 
world and themselves. (Keep in mind: system-
borders are always drawn in sense. Th ey are 
sense-borders.) Th e world is formed by sense-
ful operations and as such it is bounded to the 
systems formed also by these operations. Th e 
world as environment (the ‘outside’) and the 
identity of the observer (the system; the ‘in-
side’) are both eff ects of senseful operations. 
Sense is not a substance but a relation. It is not 
essential, but processual.  ❋
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